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The Protestant Churches During the Nazi Persecution
and the Holocaust
Alice L. Eckardtl
The prescribed title is nicely ambiguous insofar as it does 
not identify the object of Nazi persecution. Were the churches 
victims of persecution? If so, how much, and on what grounds? 
That is one question we must consider. Another asks what the 
churches did or did not do regarding the persecution of others by 
the Nazi state, and in particular about the persecution and 
murder of Jews (since that is the basic meaning of the term 
"Holocaust"). Both these questions apply to churches outside the 
Third Reich as well as within, but since it was in Germany itself 
that the churches first faced the test of National Socialism and 
a totalitarian state, and since that testing persisted throughout 
the twelve years of the regime, and since the testing included 
the churches’ knowledge of the horrendous crimes of its 
government, we need to consider the situation there first and in 
greater detail than elsewhere. Moreover, there was a difference 
for Christians in Germany as against those in other countries 
because the issue of national loyalty was primary in the first 
case but usually was not in the second.
Was the churchr^ic^ial 1 y ii
.ntended to be the next target and 
victim of the National Socialist regime after the war was won, as
most German church members .or^students —thr Naa nr-mra have 
contended, (at least a few years ago when I and my husband were 
asking questions)^, If so, what did that mean for individual 
Christians — bishops, superintendents, pastors, and laity?
the position of at least as ultimateJews and Christians, 
victims, clearly is not accurate. Even had the National 
Socialist state decided on the total destruction of the churches 
as institutions, individual Christians could have evaded that 
fate by giving up or modifying their faith and becoming good 
Nazis or "German Christians" (as many in fact did during the 
twelve years of the Third Reich). That is what the Party hoped 
for since 957. of the German people officially belonged to the 
Protestant and Catholic Churches.2 (Only Christians who proved 
to be too "Jewish" in their Neltanschauung were considered 
dangerous enough to put in concentration camps and/or be 
executed.) But Jews could do nothing to evade annihilation; 
from the perspective of National Socialist ideology, they were, 
as we know, inherently and incorrigibly tainted and must 
therefore be "exterminated" (to use the Nazis’ own terminology). 
The very fact that Hitler could see some short-term function in 
the churches’ existence and was willing to consider strategic 
factors in dealing with them underlines the fundamental 
difference in his presuppositions and aims regarding church 
members and Jews.
Most churches and their leaders at the time, on the whole, 
did not indicate by their words or actions that they believed 
they were in line for destruction,(4) particularly in the early 
years which were the crucial ones for any effective resistance. 
Instead, the churches sought to demonstrate their genuine 
solidarity with the German nation and Voik. and to work out a 
place for themselves within the country’s new era.
Hitler himself was somewhat vague on the ultimate fate of
the churches (although he showed disdain for the Protestant 
church, while holding some reluctant admiration for the Roman 
Catholic church, especially the Jesuits). Within the Party there 
were widely differing views.
The term "church struggle" is widely used in consideration 
of the present subject. But the meaning of the term changed in 
the course of the years with which we are concerned, and there is 
some significance in those changes, as we will see.
The churches had six basic issues to resolve in their 
relation to the National Socialist movement and, after 1933, to 
its Government:
1. The question of the ideology of Nazism vis-a-vis 
Christian doctrine and theology. Could they be made compatible?
2. The independence of the institutional churches to 
teach, proclaim the Gospel, and carry out pastoral work (as 
against submission to directives from and control by the State).
3. The stand to be taken (or not taken) on matters of 
justice and inhumanity in general.
4. The position to be espoused with regard to Hitler’s 
wars — whether to support or oppose them or remain quiet on the 
subject.
5. The issue of whether the church’s primary duty was 
to obey the Government or to take exception to it on behalf of 
duty to a higher power, namely, God or the gospel. (This basic 
question underlay all of the issues in fact.)
Finally, 6. the stand to take — or not to take — 
regarding the Party’s and State’s ideology about and treatment of 
Jews, including at last the "Final Solution" (End1 osuna).
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In Germany Protestantism was primarily Lutheran, with 
Re-formed and Lutheran-Re-formed Union churches second. Though 
there was not the great multiplicity of denominations as in this 
6, country, the churches v^re nevertheless split up into at least 28 
synods and branches. In considering how they dealt with the si>{ 
issues, we find that there are five time periods within which the 
fundamental decision-making and crises occurred!
First, the 1920s to 1933 — during which years National 
Socialism emerged and challenged other political parties and 
institutions — including the churches— for the people’s 
commitment and devotion.
These churches were heirs of developments of the late-18th 
and 19th centuries that produced in the German states a counter­
revolution as a reaction against anti-cl ericalism, against
democracy, and against emancipation of Jews.3 Consequently, 
during the crucial decade of the 1920s the German Evangelical 
churches threw their weight on the side of the anti-democratic 
forces, since, as one pastor put it, "all efforts to make the 
State democratic are basically designed to déchristianisé the 
Volk. We Christians remain reactionaries by God’s grace."4
An even more serious problem was the further extension or 
modification of Luther’s doctrine of the two realms. According 
to the doctrine, the state and the church were both divinely 
instituted, each with its own sphere of responsibility and 
primacy, the state’s being that of responsibility for all secular 
matters relating to its subjects, and the church’s, for all 
spiritual matters. The relationship between the two authorities 
was effected through their alliance ("Throne and Altar").
5
From the end o-f the 18th century a "broadstream o-f 
religious -feeling with a pietistic colouring found its way into 
budding German patriotism," so much so that "'whole conceptual 
structures from pietism' were transferred directly into 
patriotism." The idea of a social contract between people and 
state was discarded, and the relationship was interpreted as a 
"community of love and faith," entry into which would provide 
"supreme fulfilment." Freedom was only freedom for the state. 
And, most significantly, death for the Fatherland was equated 
with Christ’s redeeming death: "'Like the blood and wounds of 
Christ, the blood and wounds of the patriot bring salvation and 
victory, and as the dying Christ redeems Christianity Csic3, so 
the dying patriot redeems the Fatherland.’"5 Dr. Klaus Scholder 
finds that this "nationalistic Protestantism Cwasl the 
distinctive expression of the character of the Protestant church 
and piety in the nineteenth century." And the concept of God" 
tranformed so that he became "the Lord of history,. . . the Lord 
of peoples and kingdoms, the great God of battles. ..." The 
German Volk were God’s Volk, and therefore Volk, Voikstum. and 
its nation state were a "supreme order of creation." "Service of 
Volk and Fatherland Cwerel the service of God, and dedication to 
society [was] the supreme moral demand."6 At the 1927 Kirchentag 
of the Evangelical Churches this theme of obligation to uphold 
volkish solidarity by being a Voikskirche was the central 
affirmation.7 (The word "Evangelical"/Evangelisch must not be 
understood to mean "low" church or fundamentalism, but rather 
"under the Word" of God as set forth in the gospel.)
In 1933 most voices of the German Evangelical Church were raised
in celebration of the rebirth of the German nation and the
decisive breakthrough in German history which Adolf Hitler and 
his Party represented.8. Only a few perceptive churchmen believed 
that the National Socialists would actually intervene to deny the 
churches their freedom. The majority position cut the ground 
from under their opposing Hitler’s so-called "political" actions 
— which actually meant almost anything outside the spiritual 
realm. Thus the churches did not oppose the Nazi ideology unti 1 
or where it directly threatened their own ideology (theology). 
While it appears to us that all of Nazism did directly threaten 
everything the church should stand for, it did not appear so to 
most Protestants at the time.
On the issue of the Christian’s and the church’s primary 
loyalty, repeatedly church officials insisted that they were 
committed to obeying the state since it was one of the divine 
orders of creation intended by God to order and protect society. 
This continued to be true for the Confessing Church when it came 
into being, and was held by them right up until the end of the 
regime, even in its one most critical public statement about the 
Nazi state and its policies made in 1943 — the Breslau 
declaration (about which I will say more shortly.) Only a 
handful of individual Protestants came to see in the years after 
1933 that the duty to God’s commandments required them to refuse 
obedience to this state and therefore to go into active 
resistance. An even smaller number of these few were prepared 
ultimately to pray fro Germany’s defeat and/or enter into plans 
for assassinating Hitler.
Why did some Evangelicals of Germany find it ncessary to
Iform the Confessing Church? And what was its goal?
In the period from 1933 to Fall of 1935 the Party achieved 
power arid proceeded to eliminate opposition, moved step by step 
to eliminate so-called non-Aryans from roles in society, 
including from the churches; and opposition within the Protestant 
churches began to arise.
Hitler stubbed his toe (as it were) on the fact that the 
churches had come to cherish the independence from government 
that the Weimar Constitution had bestowed on them, and were ready 
to defend it against the Nazi regime when it sought to make the 
church subservient to the Party and state. The extreme views 
advocated by the party of "German Christians" within the 
churches, and Hitler’s use of them to gain control of the 
churches, further alerted some other Christians to the heresy 
that was being proposed and to resent such people being given 
exclusive power over the new centralized church. In short, the 
National Socialists "drove Protestant leaders into opposition."9 
An additional influence for a number of clergy was Karl Barth’s 
theology and his outspoken denunciation of Nazism.10
Hitler and his Party were convinced that the Protestant 
churches could easily be "coordinated" into a single Reich Church 
supporting the National Socialist government under a Reich 
Bishop, and they proceeded to act on that plan soon after taking 
power — and appeared, at first, to have succeeded.il But it was 
just at the moment of the regime’s apparent success that 
opposition began to gather within the churches. Over the summer 
and in November of ’33 the German Christians, thinking themselves 
securely in control, overstepped themselves with huge public
7
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celebrations. Their speakers called -for the ejection from the 
churches of everybody with Jewish blood, the rejection of large 
parts of the Old Testament, and the removal of certain passages 
from the New Testament, especially the writings of the "Jew 
Rabbi" Paul. They affirmed that National Socialism was the doing 
of God’s Will, the swastika was the secular form of Christ’s 
cross, that German Christianity was not dependent on the
Apostle’s Creed but on the Party and the F hrer, and that the 
Fttthrer was the herald of a new revelation.
As the theological significance of the controversy began to 
become evident, the previously used phrases "church dispute" or 
"church troubles" was replaced by "church struggle." For the 
emerging church opposition this meant a struggle against the 
German Christians within the church on behalf of having the 
church remain faithful to the Reformation confessions.
In many ways this period was the high point of the 
Protestant opposition,at least in numbers and initiative. For 
example, in September 1933 thirteen hundred pastors joined Martin 
% Ni emolí er’s Emergency Pastors’ League to combat the German
Christian heresy, and membership reached 7,000 in 1934. (After 
that it declined as a result of state and SS actions.) Then in 
May of ’34 représentâtives of all the churchesl2 met at Barmen as 
an all-German synod. Curiously enough, the police and Gestapo 
did not interfere either before or during the Synod, and this 
fact alone led many churchmen to continue to misinterpret the 
policies and goals of the regime. The Declaration adopted at 
Barmen with its six theses and six repudiations was fundamentally 
a theological declaration; its clear enunciation that "Jesus
9
Christ . . . is the one Word of God which we have to hear and 
which we have to trust and obey in li-fe and in death" was a 
positive stand against National Socialism as a political 
religion, and should have been heard as a strong word against any 
représentâtion of Hitler as herald o-f a new. Further, it 
repudiated the idea that "the State . . , should and could become 
the single and totalitarian order of human life"; that was "false 
doctrine," Such a statement would seem to have been a clear 
throwing down of the gauntlet to the regime’s totalitarian 
claims.
Yet the Confessing Church "never left any doubt that Cbeyond 
the question of its confession and church self-government it 
held] unconditional political loyalty to F hrer and Reich."13 
And it said not a word about the treatment of Jews, not even 
within the church. Dr. Burton Nelson grants that the Barmen 
Declaration certainly was not a "broadside against Adolf Hitler 
Cor] National Socialism." And certainly it "was not a frontal 
attack on the malady of antisemitism nor a clarion call to join 
in solidarity with the sufferings, harassments and persecutions 
of the Jews." It was not even "a trumpet sounding for political 
act’-i v,ement, and resistance to Nasi policies Cor] a
In October ’34 at the Synod at Dahlem the Confessing Church 
set upits own provisional church government and called on all 
congregations and pastors to obey only itsinstructions. This was 
probably "the only major public body established after 1933 
against the wishes of the state and Party."15
charter protest
Another plus for the church opposition at this time was th
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^ staunch support the Bavarian and Württemberg Protestants gave 
their respective bishops (Meiser and Wurm) when the German 
Christian Reich Bishop attempted to remove them from office for 
resisting his church government. The people’s protests, even 
against the bishops’ house arrest, led Hi ter to countermand the 
orders, to allow those Landeskirche to remain self-governing, and 
to dismiss the Reich Bishop.16
For a brief time it appeared that the church resistance had 
succeeded in its goal of establishing its internal freedom.
However, the temporary success also began the downslide 
because it broke up the unified front. The Bavarian and 
ÌÀ Württemberg churches decided to follow their own separate
policies, seeking to influence Hitler and the Reich officials by 
moderation and loyalty.
Hence, by the Fall of 1935 the Confessing Church was using 
the term "church struggle" to stand for both the past struggles 
against the German—Christians and the present controversy over 
new state intervention in church affairs. The limited nature of 
the struggle is revealed by Otto Di beli us’s comment to the new 
Reich Minister: "Let the church order its affairs in real
freedom. . . then the church struggle can be over in three
months."17
From Fall 1935 into 1938 a see-saw struggle between the 
Reich government and various groupings of the church opposition 
ensued.18 1936 and ’37 were crucial years for the Party was
consolidating its state power everywhere including over the 
church resistance. By December 1936 the term church struggle 
stood for what those still in the Confessing Church now saw as a
more -fundamental battle between Christianity and National 
Socialism.19 Consequently in May 1936 the Provisional Government 
o-f the Con-fessing Church sent a private Memorandum to Hitler 
which, -for the -first time, directly criticized the government 
politically. It denied that blood, race, and nationality 
con-ferred a special status on the German people, and insisted 
that the Christian is obliged by the First Commandment to reject 
this scale o-f values. Any antisemitism that demanded hatred o-f 
the Jew was a negation o-f brotherly love. It objected to the 
misuse o-f the loyalty oath (to make protest impossible), "to the 
manipulation o-f the electorate, the concentration camps, and the 
lack of rights in the face of attacks by the Gestapo."20 This 
was the only official declaration by the Confessionals on the 
subject of antisemitism during the Third Reich. And even here the 
main emphasis was not on the victims so much as on the effect of 
the antisemitic policies on Christian conscience. We need to 
remember also that the Confessing Church was always a minority 
within the Evangelical Church.
The state immediately responded to the ’36 memo by a series 
of reprisals: arresting pastors (500 in ’37), seizing Church 
funds and restricting church collections, banning church 
publications, excluding Confessing church youth from 
universities, refusing teaching certificates to young 
theologians, and drafting pastors. The success of these moves 
was demonstrated by the signing of personal loyalty oaths to the 
Führer by many pastors after 1936, with the rest following suit 
in the summer of 1938 after Bishop Marahrens had ordered all in 
his diocese to sign it.21
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The -fourth period — March 1938 to June ’41 — was a period 
of national expansion by political terrorism and war, along with 
further restrictions and physical assaults on Jews in Germany, 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; and the fifth period — June 
’41 to May ’45 — saw total war, and total war against Europe’s 
Jews. Church resistance was further weakened and undercut by 
national loyalty and obedience, even though war was not generally 
welcorned.
Even a Confessing Church prayer service of confession and 
intercession, drawn up at the ^^^ime of the Czech crisis in 
October ’38, was held to be ti^sonous because it did not include 
prayers for the FÌihrer, the Sudeten Germans, or German victory. 
Conscientious objection was not an acceptable position within any 
of the churches because of the duty to obey the state, which had 
the right to use warfare in order to protect its people. Many 
pastors saw their being drawn into the military engagement as an 
"inner liberation" from a sense of guilt and impotence.
Hitler’s government was almost never confronted or opposed 
on the policies that condemned millions to death. Only with 
regard to the so-called euthanasia program did churchmen make 
significant, repeated, and public protests. The churches and 
their hierarchies did not publicly raise objections to the 
concentration camps, the abolition of the Constitution and its 
means of protecting human rights, the anti-Jewish decrees, the 
wars of aggression, oppressive occupation policies, use of 
foreign slave labor, or the "Final Solution" itself. However, 
finally in October 1943 the Confessing synod of the Old Prussian 
Union, meeting at Breslau, issued a genuine political protest —
Í
"the only major public protest o-f the war. "22 The focus of the 
document was the Fifth Commandment: "Thou shalt not kill."
While it repeated the Church’s belief that the state had a right 
to protect society by waging a just war, it asserted that "the 
state was no longer waging a just war." By killing non­
belligerents, the defenseless, hostages, prisoners, the 
unhealthy, and the wounded, it had overstepped the bounds of a 
just war and "flagrantly violated the Fifth Commandment." It 
accused the Nazi regime of having "provoked other peoples to war, 
taken delight in the spilling of blood and in the suffering of 
others, and Cof being! guilty of hatred and the thirst of 
revenge." Yet even here the phrase "liquidation of the Jews" was 
deleted from the final form. It its place the Breslau
declaration declared: "The life of the people of Israel is
sacred to God . , . and other people may not take it upon
themselves to punish Israel for its unbelief." The first part of 
the document concluded, "we have the responsibility to do what is 
right before God and to obey God rather than men."23
Those who had been involved in producing the declaration, 
and in reading it from their pulpits expected at the very least 
to be arrested. Strangely enough, "there is no evidence of
reprisals by the regime." But this was the last political 
protest the Confessing Church made.24
With regard to the sixth issue — what stand to take, if 
any, on the treatment of and ideology about Jews, including the 
extermination campaign — we have already had indications of the 
churches’ reluctance.
□f course the negative attitudes and ideas about Jews were
14
not created ex ni hi lo by the Nazis or Hitler. The long history 
of antisemitism in Germany combined with the strong emotional 
commitment to the Volk to make the public particularly
susceptible to the National Socialist antisemitism.25
And throughout the 1920s the anti-Jewish platform had been 
bolstered and given validation by the Church press, which spread 
"legitimate 'Christian’ antisemitism" to its estimated six 
million readers in the middle and lower-middle classes. The Jews 
were held responsible for all that was amiss or that was lacking 
in the contemporary situation.
The churches generally emphasized the divine curse imposed 
upon Israel (rather than the alternative of God’s choice of and 
promise to the Jewish people as remaining intact), as for example 
O Martin Niemoller’s sermon in 1935 delivered on the Sunday
dedicated in the German church to the memory of the destruction 
of Jerusalem. He spoke about
the dark mystery that envelopes the sinister history of this 
people which can neither live nor die, because it is under a 
curse which forbids it to do either . . . Until the end of
time the Jewish people must go its own way under the burden 
which the Word of Judgment of Jesus has laid upon it. . . . 
ó (Niem^-ller then rather contradi ctori ly cautioned his
congregation not to show hatred to this divinely accursed people 
at a time when "God’s Judgment" was in full swing.)26
When the Nuremberg racial laws were proclaimed and put into 
effect, no Protestant church contested the right of the State to 
pass such laws, and none protested against such treatment of 
fellow countrymen.
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The same was true for Kristai 1 nacht (Nov. 9-10, 1938). In 
its aftermath a Protestant pastor in Munich sermonized: "The 
Scriptures predicted the blood of Christ would be visited upon 
the Jews. . . the hour seems to have struck and the Jews’ fate to 
have been ordained by divine will."27
The churches never comprehended the extent of Nazi 
antisemitism and its policies, or was willing to face its 
implications.
Even after the murder camps were in operation, and knowledge 
was certainly in the hands of high ranking churchmen, the church 
said nothing publicly. "28
It was not until mid-’43 that Bishop Wurm began to write a 
series of private letters to various Reichministers expressing 
his horror at the treatment of Jews. 29 Why did Wurm wait 
until the middle of 1943 to do this when he could have been in no 
doubt about the "Final Solution" at least in 1942? None of the 
Protestant bishops shared with their congregations what they knew 
about the crimes the state was committing, nor did they challenge 
them (or offer them the opportunity) to stand up as Christians 
and do right. And of course the very few criticisms came far too 
late.
Ironically, the Nazis themselves knew that Wurm and Mei ser 
constituted major roadblocks on the way to total nazification of 
the nation.30 And these two bishops remained free because of the 
mass support they had from their church people. So the potential 
for different behavior, with possibly different results, was 
there. Yet Sarah Gordon finds in her study that there was more 
antisemitism among church attendants than among those who had
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ceased to attend church services.
A statement produced by a small group o-f laymen and clergy 
in 1943 <the Munich Laymen’s Epistle) in Bavaria demonstrates the 
other side that needed to be developed:
As Christians we can no longer tolerate the Church in 
Germany keeping silent about the persecution o-f the Jews 
. . . . We recognize our share o-f the blame for neglect Cof 
the right exercise of the preaching office!. . . . ENow!
at last Ethe Church can begin! to do what she ought to have 
done so long ago."
The concluding words are perhaps the best denial of there having 
been any real church struggle, and they were written by 
contemperaries;
"Everything that has hitherto been done in this matter Eof 
the persecution of the Jews! by the Church in Germany cannot 
be regarded as Eproper! witness, for it has neither taken 
place in public nor has it been in its content correctly 
aligned to the genuine task of the preaching off ice."31 
Klaus Scholder adds today; The term "church struggle" must not 
be used "to suggest continuous political resistance by the 
churches against National Soci alism."32
For the church to have addressed the real threat that 
National Socialism posed to the nation it would have had to have 
gone further than Barmen’s theological stance and have taken a 
stand on grounds of justice and humanitarianism. And this it was 
not ready to do. The church was still hampered by its Lutheran 
tradition that allotted all "political" matters to the state’s 
domain, including human rights and racial matters. (Just as it
16
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was hampered regarding the Nazis’ Jewish policies by its 
traditional supersessi onist theology that could not find a 
positive place -for Jews as Jews but only as potential converts.)
The -free churches (Methodists, Baptists, Seventh Day 
Adventists, Quakers) and sects in Bermany (which contained a very 
smal 1 number o-f members) capitulated to Nazism, either in order 
to survive, or because o-f being convinced by Nazi ideology, with 
only one exception: the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Adventists 
(who numbered about 36,000 in 1933) so heartily endorsed the 
National Socialist program and were so success-ful in adapting to 
the new state — despite their initial handicap of seeming to 
most resemble Jews — that their ministers alone among 
Protestants were exempted -from bearing arms.33 The Adventists 
made no public statements condemning the euthanasia program and 
even came to welcome the sterilization measures as good for the 
nation and therefore in accord with Christianity.34
What about churches outside Bermany?
The Scandinavian countries are particularly interesting 
because, although having an established Lutheran church as did 
Bermany, they behaved so differently.
In Norway the Lutheran churchmen followed closely the 
reactions of the Berman Lutheran church to the rise of Nazism, 
and were disturbed to find that supporters of National Socialism 
within the church also endorsed the anti-Jewish legislation. 
They were encouraged by the emergence of the Confessing Church, 
and particularly its 1936 memorandum to Hitler. After the Berman
1 18
invasion of Norway (April 1940) the church was granted a period 
of non-interference by the Nazis. However, the German promise to 
observe the Hague Convention regarding full religious freedom in 
occupied regions soon proved to be a delusion; the churches were 
expected to fully support the Nazi-appointee Quisling and his 
Norwegian Nazi Party (Nasjonal Sämling). But the Norwegian 
church "was ready to do battle" against the intent to nazify the 
Norwegian people, and Bishop Berggrav became the leader and 
spokesman of this resi stance. 35 In October 1940 the church 
opposition agreed on a consolidation under a Christian Joint 
Council for the Norwegian Church-36
In January 1941 the Norwegian Bishops directly challenged 
the state, on the basis of the Norwegian Constitution, on three 
issues: the "systematic rule of terror by the Norwegian Nazi 
stormtroopers;" the conditions that had led the Supreme Court to 
resign; and interference by the state with the ministers’ Oath of 
Silence. They sent their communication to all the churches as a 
pastoral letter, establishing a policy consistently followed of 
keeping their people informed of their actions. A pertinent 
sentence read: "When those in authority in the society tolerate 
violence and injustice and oppress the souls of men, then the 
Church is the guardian of men’s conscience." (This letter also 
reached London and was broadcast to the world.)
Harassment of clergy — arrests, confiscation of their 
property, and threats of deportation and even death — followed 
by the state’s dismissal of the dean of the Trondheim Cathedral 
led the Bishops unanimously to "cease admini strati ve cooperation 
with a State which practices violence against the Church." On
19
April 5, 1942 they set up a new church independent of the 
Norwegian Nasi state. The founding declaration made clear when 
obedience was due to the state and when protest and opposition 
were called for (by non~violent resistance). God’s sovereignty 
came before all ideologies. The "Berggrav Church" insisted that 
the state could be considered a divine creation "only if it did 
not force one to act against God’s commandments. Only a state 
based on justice could demand obedience." Please note; "This 
was a new interpretation of the Lutheran concept of the State."37
The local pastors read the founding declaration to their 
congregations, and then resigned as civil servants, but continued 
to function as clergymen. Out of a total of 699 ministers, 645 
resigned.38 The Norwegian Church was no longer a state church 
but a free church dependent on their congregations for financial 
support, which was provided generously. The State churches with 
their Nasi—appointed bishops and ministers were empty while the 
Berggrav churches were packed.
In the fall of ’42 a full scale attack on Norwegian Jews 
went into operation, with men arrested on October 26, and women 
and children a month later. This latter group was put on a troop 
transport that very day and sent to Auschwitz. In November the 
Temporary Church Leadership sent a sharp protest to Minister 
President Quisling against the persecution of Jews.
Unfortunately, prior to this time, as the anti-Jewish 
measures were being instituted one after another,39 the church 
had remained silent and had done little to "stem the tide of 
rising antisemitism in Norway." This was a case where 
Berggrav’s strategy of waiting to allow the German’s true
intentions to reveal themselves before making protests proved 
disastrous. As Arne Massing points out, with regard to the Jews 
of Norway, this strategy "sacrificed moral principle on two 
counts": First, since the Nasi treatment of Jews was based on 
race right from the start, this alone "violated Christian 
theological and moral principles"; second, the decision showed 
"willingness to sacrifice human beings ... on the altar of 
strategy." The reinstatement of the Constitution’s exclusionary 
clause on March 12, 1942,40 the use of questionnaires about 
racial identity, and the insertion of "J" on Jewish identity 
cards ought to have "sufficient provocation for church 
intervention." If the church had publicly denounced antisemitism 
and defended Jewish rights from the outset, it "could have 
created a public awareness of Nazi policy toward Jews as a 
special point of Christian conscience and moral principle."41
The Germans’ brutal treatment, arrests, and deportation of 
Jews in October and November ’42 aroused the Norwegian people and 
"this sense of agony was articulated by the Norwegian Lutheran 
Church."42 The letter of protest challenged Quisling to live up 
to his promise to protect the basic Christian values and stop the 
violation of God’s commandment . . . ." "Stop the persecution of 
the Jews and stop the race hatred which ... is being spread in 
our land." Signatures to the protest came from all sections of 
Norway’s Protestant community.43
The Norwegian Lutherans asserted that it was the "Church’s 
God-given duty as the conscience of the State to object" to the 
antisemi tic measures.44 The protest had widespread support 
throughout the country,45 and also abroad.
For example, the Swedish Bishops quoted the Norwegian letter 
in their pastoral letters that expressed their own protest.46
In May 1943 the church leadership had to go underground 
•following the arrest of two signers of another protest. Even so, 
hundreds of ministers were deported to other parts of the country 
or German concentrâtion camps (where 2 died).
Dr. Samuel Abrahamsen considers that the Church of Norway 
was "a bastion of resistance," supported by the people of Norway, 
the majority of whom "showed repeatedly, by word and act, their 
complete and uncompromising opposition to Hitler and Quisling in 
their attempts to establish a Nazi-Norwegian Church" and a 
nazified-Norwegian society.47 (We have already noted Arne 
Hassing’s modification of that praise.)
The outstanding response of the people of Denmark is too 
well known to be repeated here. Although that rescue operation 
was much more than a church action, the Danish Lutheran Church 
played a significant role. It should be noted that even before 
the war, in November 1938, a Danish Bishop spoke at a church 
service about the deep pain that the Christians felt as they 
learned about the persecution of Jews in Germany.48 For the 
Danes the sturggle during the German occupation was "not just a 
question of the Jews and their rights; Ebut of] the right of a 
small nation to exist Con] the basis of democracy; equality and 
human dignity."49
When the roundup of Jews began on October 1-2, ’43, the 
immediate protest (which had been planned for ahead of time in 
case it would be needed) reminded the Occupation authorities that
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although as Danish Bishops they were conscious o-f their 
responsibility to be law-abiding citizens, who would not 
needlessly revolt against those who hold authority, they were 
"obliged" by their conscience to "maintain the law and to protest 
against any violation o-f human rights. "50
The Danish Church resistance began early and let its people 
know that it intended to take a -firm line on antisemitism and on 
all issues o-f injustice. It did not vacillate, And it prepared 
for what might happen.
By contrast the Protestant churches of The Netherlands did 
not prepare itself or its people; they failed to maintain unity 
in resi stance;they did not act early enough; and they vacillated 
under German threats of severe reprisals (for which it is hard to 
blame them since Germany treated the Dutchmuch more harshly than 
any other western European nation).51
In France "the first clear voice of opposition from among 
non-Jews to Vichy’s antisemitism came from French Protestantism" 
despite their initial fear that they themselves would become 
victims to Vichy’s "National Revolution" especially since they 
had often been linked with Jews and the rest of "anti-France." 
Even as late as the summer of 1941 the rumors were rife, "After 
the Jews and the Freemansons, the Protestants."52
Following up on "discreet objections" made by Pastor Marc 
Boegner to the government against the anti-Jewish laws (Statut 
des juifs) at the end of 1940,53 a politely worded written
protest was sent to Admiral Francois Darían (himself of
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Protestant origins) in March ’41 and to the Grand Rabbi o-f France 
(Isaie Schwarts) (which was published in the press of the 
Occupied and Unoccupied Zone). The letter referred to the French 
Protestants’ own history of suffering and persecution in the past 
and its sympathy for the Jewish community now suffering from 
"misfortune," and assured the Jewish community that they would 
continue in their efforts to have the law altered.
After the second Jewish law was passed in June 1941, more 
protests were made, including a letter from Boegner to Marshall 
Petain.54 Even a strong appeal made to Petain by a close friend, 
Rene Gillouin, against Vichy’s anti-Jewish policy as a Christian 
heresy and its adoption by France as a "denial of its spiritual 
taith and its moral personality" failed.55 Petain did nothing.
In mid-’42 the wearing of the yellow star was required, and 
the rounding up and deporting of thousands of Jews from all over 
France followed. The Protestant voices of protest were viewed as 
"troublesome" but "marginal."56
A Protestant group CIMADE, organized in 1939 out of a youth 
movement to assist internees, took on more and more clandestine 
help to Jews.
Of course the best known instance of French Protestants 
working as a united community under the inspiration and direction 
of two pastors (Andre Trocme and Edouard Theis) is Le Chambón, 
which sheltered thousands of Jews who managed to reach the 
village, and helped many to cross into Switzerland. It is less 
well known that other Protestant villages in the Haute Loire, the 
Hautes Alpes, and the Tarn also gave this kind of aid (though in 
smaller numbers than Le Chambón). Despite the risks they ran.
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these Protestant communities re-fused to cease of-fering help.
Two -further items about the French Protestant churches;
1. There was a conservative and independent Calvinist church 
<Eglise re-formee evangel ique indépendante) which "was far more 
respectful of Vichy and favorable to the anti-Jewish laws than 
the Protestant mainstream," which was deeply distressed over the 
anti-Jewish 1egisi ation.57
2. There was a strongly theological basis for the Protestant 
position, which was spelled out at a meeting of sixteen leaders 
in September 1941 (at Tarascón in the Bouches-du-Rhone);
. . . the Church recognizes in Israel the people that God 
elected to give a Savior to the world, and that is to be, 
amidst the nations, a permanent witness to the mystery of 
its fidelity. That is why, while recognizing that the state 
finds itself faced with a problem which it has to solve, it 
raises a solemn protest against any law placing Jews outside 
the human community.58
In sum, the church had to have a clear conviction of its 
commitment to the one God of creation and to the rights of all 
God’s children to justice, equality, and life. It needed to be 
ready to defend those commitments against any infringement, 
including by its own national government. It needed to act at 
the first signs of injustice and misuse of state power. And it 
needed to seek allies from any who shared the basic commitment to 
humanity regardless of doctrinal differences. Even so, it might 
not have been able to stop the Nazi state, especially in its 
Jewish policies. But the church’s fidelity would not now be so
subject to suspicion and criticism. A di-fterent foundation for 
the post-war churches would have been created.
Have we ourselves learned these lessons? Where are our 
churches today? How would they respond if faced with a similar 
chai 1 enge?
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